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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION, 
Utah Copper Division, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
Case No. 15939 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH and BILL BILfu~ZICH, 
Defendants-Respondents, 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEHENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Defendant-Respondent, Bilanzich, filed an applica-
tion with the Industrial Commission requesting compensation. 
Plaintiff, Appellant, Kennecott, denied the claim and a hear-
ing was held before the Industrial Commission. 
DISPOSITION BY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
The Industrial Commission, by its Administrative 
Law Judge made a certain award to the Defendant, Bilanzich, 
and against Kennecott Copper Corporation, Utah Copper Division 
for the total sum of $5,963.67 plus medical costs incurred as 
a result of the accident. On request of appellant this award 
was reviewed by the entire commission and affirmed. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Respondent seeks an Order from this 
Court affirming the actions of the Industrial Commission. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Bill Bilanzich is a 45 year old laborer who was 
employed by Kennecott Copper approximately 10 years prior 
to the injury involved. (R.S,6). He was employed as a hard 
rock miner in 1974 when he placed a great deal of tension 
on a crow bar and fell in such a manner that all of his 
weight went against his left wrist causing an injury. (R. 7). 
The witness produced by the Plaintiff-Appellant, 
Kennecott, testified that Mr. Bilanzich was a very good worker 
and not the type to complain about anything (R.46). Mr. 
Bilanzich testified that he felt pain in the wrist but thought 
it was a sprain which would cure itself. (R.9). 
The Defendant cared for the injury because he felt 
he could not afford to take time off. (R.60). However, 
the pain grew worse and the left hand began to stiffen 
so Mr. Bilanzich went to the company doctor who was employed 
by Kennecott Copper Corporation. (R.lO). 
The company doctor informed Mr. Bilanzich that he 
had waited too long for treatment and that all he could do 
was wrap his wrist. (R.ll). The pain in the wrist continued 
and the company doctor treated the wrist until about March 
of 1977 and then sent Mr. Bilanzich to a Dr. Berk. (R.l2, 
Report of Dr. Gubler). 
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Mr. Bilanzich then was examined and treated by Dr. 
Lamb and advised that his health would not allow him to 
continue his work at Kennecott. (See Report of Dr. Lamb). 
The applicant was then evaluated by orthopedic 
surgeon, A. Owen Smoot, at the request of the Industrial Comm-
ission and Dr. Smoot concluded that the Industrial accident 
was the significant cause of Mr. Bilanzich's wrist problem 
and that Defendant-Respondent was entitled to three month 
temporary total disability for recovery from the surgery to 
the wrist and for medical expenses and an award of permanent 
partial disability. (See Report of Dr. Smoot). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN 
DETERMINING THAT THE APPLICM~T WAS ENTITLED 
TO COMPENSATION BECAUSE THE LAST COMPENSATION 
WAS PAID WITHIN THREE YEARS FROM THE DATE OF 
THE APPLICATION. 
The application was filed on May 18, 1977, and the 
applicant was treated for the injury by the company doctor 
from September of 1974 until March of 1977. The treatment 
consisted of medical examination, x-rays and the dispensing 
of drugs. The Plaintiff claims that this is not compensation 
under Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-99 which provides the follow-
ing: 
"When an employee claiming to have suffered an in-
jury in the service of his employer fails to give 
notice to his employer of the time and place where 
the accident and injury occurred, and of the nature 
of the same, within forty-eight hours, whe~ P?ssib~e, 
or fails to report for medical treatment w~th~n sa~d 
time, the compensation provided for herein shall be 
reduced fifteen percent; provided, that knowledge of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization pr vided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Libr ry.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-4-
such injury obtained from any source on the part of 
such employer, person in authority, or knowledge of 
any assertion by the injured sufficient to afford an 
?Pportunity to the employer to make an investigation 
~nto the facts and to provide medical treatment shall 
be equivalent to such notice; and no defect or in-
accuracy therein shall subject the claimant to such 
reduction, if there was no intention to mislead 
or prejudice the employer in making his defense, and 
the employer was not, in fact, so misled or pre-
judiced thereby. If no notice of the accident and 
injury is given to the employer within one year from 
the date of the accident, the right to compensation 
shall be wholly barred. If no claim for compensa-
tion is filed with the Industrial Commission within 
three years from the date of the accident or the 
date of the last payment of compensation, the right 
to compensation shall be wholly barred. (Emphasis 
Supplied). 
Compensation is defined in Section 35-1-44 (6), 
Utah Code Ann. (1953 as Amended), as follows: 
"Compensation shall mean the payments and 
benefits provided in this title." 
The payments and benefits provided in this title 
are set forth in Section 35-1-45, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as 
Amended), as follows: 
"Colilpensation for Industrial Accidents to 
be paid.--Every employee mentioned in Section 
35-1-43 who is injured, and the dependants of 
every such employee who is killed, by accident 
arising out of or in the course of his employ-
ment, wheresoever such injury occurred, provided 
the same was not purposely self-inflicted, shall 
be entitled to receive and shall be paid, such 
compensation for loss sustained on account of 
such injury or death, and such amount for medical, 
nurse, and hospital services and medicines, and, 
in case of death, such amount of funeral expenses, 
as is herein provided. (Emphasis added) . 
Kennecott paid the company doctor and also paid for 
the x-rays and the drugs that were dispensed. They knew of 
the accident and knew that this medical treatment was delivered 
in connection with the accident. Surely this is compensation 
as defined in the statutes set forth above. The practice of 
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the State Insurance Fund and other carriers is not to pay 
the applicant directly for medical expenses and x-rays, but 
to deliver a check to the proper doctor, hospital or clinic 
on receipt of documents demonstrating the treatment was pro-
vided. 
In this case the payments were made directly to the 
persons treating the applicant and such unilateral action 
should not benefit a self-insurer such as Kennecott. 
The Plaintiff claims that the case of Gardner v. 
Industrial Commission, 30 Ut.2d 377, 517 P.2d 1329 (1973), 
is dispositive of this case because of the language contained 
therein. The Defendant disagrees with the Plaintiffs assess-
ment of that case and claims those facts are not the same as 
the facts now before this Court. In that case the State 
Insurance Fund made payment for the loss suffered by the acci-
dent, x-rays, etc.; the last payment being made on October 25, 
1968. The applicant then saw the doctor again on July 18, 
1971, who sent him to another doctor. A second doctor also 
examined the applicant, but the Industrial Commission or 
the State Insurance Fund was not given notice of these events 
and this Court held that the three year staute of limita-
tions applied because there had to be a payment and not 
simply treatment. (Emphasis added). 
In that case, the Supreme Court indicated that 
the last payment made on October 25, 1968, included pay-
ment for x-rays and stated that this was the last payment. 
In the instant case, the applicant contends that the date 
of last payment is the last time that the applicant was 
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examined by the company doctor because the doctor was paid 
and the company knew of the payment. The first examination 
by the company doctor is a late enough date to allow the 
applicants to come within the three year statute of limi-
tations, and the last examination was in 1977. 
The Plaintiff contends that payment of the company 
doctor and payments for x-rays and drugs do not constitute 
compensation and the statute of limitations is applicable. 
The applicant contends that under the Gardner case, supra, 
that the payment of the doctor, x-rays, and drugs by the 
Plaintiff initiates a date of last compensation. The 
Plaintiff relys on Kennecott Copper Corporation vs. Anderson, 
30 Ut.2d 102, 514 P.2d 217 (1973), for the proposition that 
compensation payments do not include medical and hospital 
expenses. This Court in that case was construing Sections 
35-1-66 and 35-1-78, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as Amended), to 
determine whether an applicant was entitled to additional dis-
ability after the six year period expired and whether the app-
licant was entitled to additional medical payments. This 
Court quoted Larson on Workmans Compensation, Section 66 PP. 
88. 225 et seq., for the general rule that medical benefits 
are not subject to the same limitations as the compensation 
for wages lost or disability rating. The Court did not say 
in that case that payment of medical expenses was not compen-
sation under Section 35-1-99, Utah Code Ann. (as Amended). 
The Court did say in that case that: 
''Also having a bearing on our conclusion is 
the administrative interpretation which the 
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Commission has given the statute. Although 
not controlling, in the event of doubt, such 
interpretation is entitled to some consideration 
and may be regarded as persuasive." 
In the instant case the Commission has determined 
that compensation has been consistantly construed to include 
the payment of medical expenses. Although this finding of 
the Commission is not controlling, the Defendant, Bilanzich, 
requests this Court to consider such interpretation and re-
gard same as persuasive. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT ABUSE 
ITS DESCRETION IN DETERMINING THAT THE 
APPLICANT WAS ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION, 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF \vAS ESTOPPED FROM 
ASSERTING THE LIHITATION PERIOD. 
The concuring opinion of Mr. Justice Wolfe in 
the case of McKee v. Industrial Commission, 115 U. 550, 
206 P.2d 715 (1949), sets forth the policy behind the 
three year limitation period which is concerned in this 
case. 
"Furthermore, there are comparatively few cases 
where disability arises more than three years 
after the accident or occurs three years after 
the last payment. And as to those cases the 
statute was meant to provide for a period after 
which the insurance carrier could safely cease 
to carry reserves against a definate accident. 
The matter of whether an overall period of three 
years is too short is for the legislature. There 
will undoubtedly be cases of hardship when a 
man will suffer a residual disability from an 
old injury." 
In this case the disability was caused by the 
accident and Kennecott, through its doctor, was aware of 
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the injury during the three year period of limitation. Kenn-
ecott is a self insurer and its agent, Dr. Gubler, either did 
not know or chose not to disclose the nature of the injury to 
the Defendant. The company doctor treated the Defendant for 
the injury from September 23, 1974 until March 21, 1977, when 
the applicant was referred to an orthopedic surgeon. 
It is the contention of the Defendant that the 
Plaintiff is estopped from claiming the benefit of the statute 
of limitations for the reason that the employers doctor did 
not advise this applicant of the extent of his injury and did 
not refer him to an orthopedic surgeon until almost three 
years after the date of the accident. 
The general rules concerning estoppel are set 
forth in the case of McKee v. Industrial Commission, supra, 
and although, in that case the Industrial Commission did 
not find the estoppel, the facts in the instant case, led 
the Industrial Commission to a dif~prent conclusion. If 
this Court does not sustain the commission on the basis of 
Point I, then applicant requests the Court to affirm the 
decision of the commission on the basis of estoppel. 
CONCLUSION 
Medical expenses, including x-rays, drugs and 
examinations by a company doctor were paid by the Plaintiff 
and constitute compensation under the statute. The company 
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should not gain the benefit of its doctor providing mini-
mal care until the limitation period expires. The award 
of the Industrial Commission should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
Michael W. Park 
Park & Braithwaite 
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